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I. INTRODUCTION

The stability and growth of domestic financial markets rarely escape the
attention of a nation's policy makers. Such has been particularly true in Japan,
where economic stimulation has been a top priority since the collapse of its
bubble economy in the early 1990s.1 Over a decade later, "the year 2006 may
come to be remembered as a watershed in Japan's long journey' 2toward
modernization of its capital markets and securities regulatory system.
That "watershed" year saw a sea-change of legislative and economic
activity. Most provisions of the comprehensive new Companies Law, passed
by the Diet (Japan's national legislature) the year before, went into effect in
May 2006.? September 2006 saw reformist Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi
retire4 after having spearheaded the privatization of Japan's $3 trillion postal
system.5 Further, on June 14, 2006, the Diet passed the Financial Instruments

Richard Small, From Tatemae to Home: A HistoricalPerspectiveon the Prohibitionof
Insider Tradingin Japan,2 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REv. 313, 347-48 (2003). As Small
explains:
Two of the major problems which beset the Japanese economy are the banks'
non-performing loans and deflation. The banks had made loans to
companies... secured on assets, the value of which were greatly inflated
during the bubble. As asset prices fell the banks found themselves with
increasing bad loans. Since corporate bankruptcy is generally discouraged in
Japan, the banks have found themselves carrying approximately Y150 trillion
in bad loans. None of the numerous efforts to clean up the banking sector
have so far completely solved the problem. In addition, deflation effectively
lowers wages which in turn discourages investment and spending, further
contributing to the economic downturn.
Id.at 348 n. 160 (internal citations omitted).
2 Walter Stuberet al., InternationalSecuritiesand CapitalMarkets, 41 INT'LLAW. 443,456
(2007).
3 Kaisha ho [Companies Law], Law No. 86 of 2005 (Japan).
4 Norimitsu Onishi, DepartingJapaneseLeader Shook up Politicsas Usual, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 19, 2006, at A10.
' Michael Doyle et al., Asia and PacificLaw, 41 INT'L LAW. 711, 720 (2007). Aside from
being a postal system,
Japan Post is easily the world's largest financial institution. It not only
operates Japan's sprawling post offices and mail delivery system, but also
runs the world's largest private savings bank and life insurance company,
accounting for 30 percent of Japan's individual savings, 40 percent of Japan's
life insurance market, and 25 percent of all personal assets in Japan.
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and Exchange Law 6 (FIEL), a sweeping overhaul of the outdated and
ineffective Securities and Exchange Law.7
The comprehensiveness of the FIEL's reformulation of Japan's securities
laws cannot be overstated. The thousand-page statute amends some eightynine different laws, some of which were abolished entirely to be merged into
the FIEL.
The FIEL's revisions begin with broadened definitions of
"security" and "derivative transaction," thereby "greatly expand[ing] the scope
of the government's regulatory power."9 Now, if a product has a "security-like
feature,"'" it is subject to the FIEL's substantive provisions, which impose
stringent disclosure rules,1' internal-control reporting requirements,12 new rules
governing the timing and disclosure of corporate-takeover bids,13 and increased
penalties for securities fraud and insider trading.14
Given the FIEL's sweeping breadth, it is not surprising that its stated
purposes are equally bold.15 Specifically, the law aims to: (1) "compile
comprehensive and cross-sectional rules for user protection and to develop an
6 Kinyu shonin toriniko [Financial Instruments and Exchange Law], Law No. 2 of 1948

(amended 2006) (Japan), translatedin 6.1 EHS LAW BuLL. SER. No. 6600 (2007) [hereinafter
FIEL]. The FIEL was adopted in conjunction with the Coordination Law for Amending the
Securities and Exchange Law and Other Financial Laws, Law No. 66 of 2006 [hereinafter all
references to the FIEL will refer both to the FIEL and its companion Coordination Law].
7 Shokentorihiki ho [Securities and Exchange Law], Law No. 25 of 1948 (as amended)
(Japan); see Joseph J. Norton & Christopher D. Olive, Globalizationof FinancialRisks and
InternationalSupervision ofBanks andSecuritiesFirms: Lessonsfrom the BaringsDebacle,30
INT'L LAW. 301, 303 (1996) (noting "[f]inancial and technological innovations have rendered
the segmentations and restrictions on the banking and securities markets, such as those
engendered by... the Japanese Securities and Exchange Law, ineffective to prevent instability
and contagion"); see also Small, supra note 1, at 320-29 (arguing that Japan's concept of law
and the structure of Japan's economy and society were not conducive to the Securities and
Exchange Law taking root and, further, that the actions of the Japanese government in the years
following the promulgation of the law demonstrated a lack of intention to enforce the law).
8 FINANcIAL SERVICES AGENCY, JAPAN, NEW LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK FOR INVESTOR

PROTECTION: FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS AND EXCHANGE LAW 3 (2006), http://www.fsa.go.jp/
en/policy/fiel/20061 01 0.pdf [hereinafter FSA DESCRIPTION].
" Walter Stuber & Adriana Marie Gbdel Stuber, InternationalInvestment andDevelopment
Committee, 42 INT'L LAW. 511, 519 (2008).
10 See id.
at 519 n.57 (noting that "straight bank deposits and plain vanilla insurance are not
regulated by the new law because they do not have security-like features that could cause their
value to drop below par").
" FIEL, Law No. 2 of 1948, art. 27-26 (amended 2006) (Japan) (requiring disclosure by
owners of large volumes of shares).
12 Id. arts. 24-4-2, 24-4-4, 24-4-8, 193-2.
'3 Id. art. 27-2.
14 Id. arts. 197, 197-2, 207.
15FSA DESCRIPTION, supra note 8, at 1.
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environment [that encourages investor confidence]"; (2) "enhance fairness and
transparency in the [Japanese] market"; and (3) "enhance the attractiveness of
the Japanese market as an international market."' 6 While these objectives could
be apropos to any number of countries, the immense amount of personal
savings amassed by the Japanese population--over $12 trillion-reveals
several things specific to Japan.' 7 First, large portions of domestic portfolio
assets are notably not at work in the Japanese stock and financial exchanges. 8
One likely reason is a lack of confidence in those markets, of which Japanese
policy makers have a uniquely strong motivation to bolster such market
confidence.' Second, given the recent volatility within the global economy,
from which Japan's financial markets have certainly not been immune,2 ° the
FIEL's objectives become all the more pressing.
The FIEL fits comfortably within a global trend of corporate-governance
and transparency legislation,2' with the United States' Sarbanes-Oxley Act
of 2002 (SOX) 22 being at least the forerunner and, occasionally, a blueprint for
16 Id.

"7Peter Harris, The Complexities of Compliance, JAPAN INC., Nov. 9, 2007, availableat
http://www.japaninc.con/mgznov-dec_2007_complexities-of-compliance.
"8A March 2006 analysis of the financial assets of Japanese and U.S. households revealed
that, while Japanese financial portfolios placed only 18.5% of assets in stocks, bonds, mutual
funds, trusts, and the like, a very sizable 50.9% of personal assets were held in cash and
deposits-this stands in stark contrast to corresponding asset-distribution figures in the United
States of 53% and 13.3%, respectively. FSA DESCRIPTION, supra note 8, at 1.
"' See Harris, supra note 17, at 20 (citing the hefty personal savings of the Japanese as an
incentive to inspire investments).
20 Previously, at the end of 2007, traders and market watchers had predicted that the
Nikkei 225 Stock Average would likely be between 14,000 and 18,000 in 2008, with some
analysts stating predictions as high as 19,000. FOCUS: Tokyo Stocks Likely to Remain Weak
Until Spring 2008, JAPAN WKLY. MONITOR, Dec. 29, 2007. However, on Oct. 10, 2008, the
Nikkei 225 fell below 9000 for the first time since June 2003. Ian Rowley, JapaneseIre at US.
Rises over Markets, Bus. WK., Oct. 10, 2008, availableat http://www.businessweek.com/global
biz/content/oct2008/gb20081010_537853.htm.
21 See, e.g., Corporate Law Economic Reform Program (Audit Reform and Corporate
Disclosure) Act, 2004 (Austl.) (requiring, among other things, that both a company's CEO and
CFO declare that the company's financial records and annual financial statements are in
compliance with applicable laws and accounting standards); Council Directive 2004/109, 2004
O.J. (L 390) 38 (EC) (mandating the disclosure of periodic financial reports in European Union
countries); Law No. 2003-706 of Aug. 1, 2003, Journal Officiel de la Rdpublique Frangaise
[J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Aug. 2, 2003, p. 13220 (emphasizing a strengthening of
internal controls).
22 Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002) (codified
as amendments in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.). SOX was enacted in the
wake of a cavalcade ofcorporate scandals for the purpose, in the words of the statute's long title,
of "protect[ing] investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures
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such international legislation. Indeed, those portions of the FIEL that require
corporate executives' certification and reporting of internal controls are
popularly known as "Japanese SOX," or more commonly, "J-SOX."
In the wake of the headline-dominating corporate and accounting scandals
of Enron and other corporate giants, the U.S. Congress fast-tracked the passage
of SOX.2 3 Though many greeted its reforms with praise, there were also those
who voiced vehement dissent. 24 Indeed, for all its intended (and realized)
benefits, SOX and its accompanying regulatory regime have not escaped harsh
criticism.
Though the specifics of the criticism may differ from that surrounding SOX,
the FIEL, much like its U.S. counterpart, continues to be the focus of strong
disapproval. However, a law of its scale will inevitably be subject to a period
of adjustment, both in the sense of market adjustment to the regulation and, if
the Japanese government is so inclined, in making necessary amendments to
the regulation to meet pressing market needs. 25 As Japan transitions from the
old laws to the FIEL, it is of primary concern whether, like the mythic Hydra,
the FIEL will turn out to be a beast with two heads instead of one. Or, will the
great reforms of the FIEL be viewed as a mighty Hercules? Specifically,
potential conflict is inherent between the FIEL's dual aims of strengthening
investor protection and re-energizing the market. Nonetheless, the FIEL's
critical revision of outdated securities regulation will most likely deliver longterm benefits, like market stabilization, outweighing short-term implementation
and compliance concerns that arise as the law is refined.
Part II of this Note examines several factors that led to the adoption of both
SOX and the FIEL, focusing particularly on corporate and accounting

made pursuant to the securities laws." Id.
23 The House of Representatives approved the Act by a vote of 334-90, with ten

representatives not voting. Clerk of the House of Representatives, Final Vote Results for Roll
Call 110, http://clerk.house.gov/evs/2002/roll 110.xml (last visited Jan. 15, 2010). In near total
unanimity, the Senate passed SOX by a vote of 99-0, with only one senator not voting. U.S.
Senate: Legislation & Records Home, Roll Call Vote, http://www.senate.gov/legislative/LIS/
roll call lists/roll call vote cfmn.cfm?congress=107&session=2&vote=00192 (last visited
Jan. 15, 2010).
24 Not surprisingly, among SOX's staunchest critics were those corporations that now found
themselves subject to the law's rigorous requirements. See Jonathan D. Glater, Here It Comes:
The Sarbanes-OxleyBacklash, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 17, 2005, at B5 ("[Blusiness representatives
gathered in Washington at an all-day roundtable discussion held by federal regulators and
complained about the cost of complying with [Section 404] of the Sarbanes-Oxley corporate
reform law.").
25 In fact, the Japanese government is so inclined and such revisions are already underway,
as discussed in Part IV of this Note.
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malfeasance. The perfect storm of factors enabling such market failures as the
Enron scandal that led to the call for the SOX reforms has been intensely
scrutinized in the years since those events unfolded.26 As such, the full breadth
of those factors will not be belabored here given this Note's primary focus on
the FIEL. Instead, this Note limits its scope to an overview of the principal
factors leading to the SOX reforms, viewed primarily through the lens of
Enron's collapse.2 7 The exposition of the FIEL in this Note will seek to
address the structural, cultural, and political elements unique to the context of
the Japanese financial market that were fundamental to identifying the need for
regulatory reform.
Part III delves into the substantive provisions of SOX and the FIEL,
explicating the commonalities between the laws and also the significant
sections of the FIEL that developed beyond the influence of SOX. Part IV
concludes with an analysis of the primary praise and criticism of SOX as well
as the intended benefits, current criticisms, and projected future of the FIEL.
II. THE ROOTS OF REFORM
A. SOX: Conditions Contributingto the Inevitable Enron Bombshell
A confluence of factors facilitated certain conditions making possible the
numerous corporate frauds that besieged U.S. markets in the early part of this
century.2" This multitude of highly publicized frauds, and particularly that at
26 See generally John C. Coffee, Jr., What CausedEnron?A CapsuleSocial andEconomic

History of the 1990s, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 269 (2004) (discussing the multi-faceted origins of
the Enron scandal and dismissing explanations such as an increase in corporate greed or that
scandals are cyclical and inevitable).
27 For an in-depth discussion of Enron's collapse, see generally Jeffrey D. Van Niel,
Enron-The Primer, in ENRON: CORPORATE FiAsCos AND THEIR IMPLCATIONS 3 (Nancy B.

Rapoport & Bala G. Dharan eds., 2004).
28 In 2004, Senator Paul Sarbanes, one of the legislators who drafted SOX and after whom
SOX is named, stated:
The Senate Banking Committee undertook a series of hearings on the
problems in the markets that had led to a loss of hundreds and hundreds of
billions, indeed trillions of dollars in market value. The hearings set out to
lay the foundation for legislation.
The hearings produced remarkable consensus on the nature of the
problems: inadequate oversight of accountants, lack of auditor independence,
weak corporate governance procedures, stock analysts' conflict of interests
[sic], inadequate disclosure provisions, and grossly inadequate funding of the
Securities and Exchange Commission.

2010]

JAPAN'S FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS AND EXCHANGE LAW

479

Enron, brought such factors fully to light and made clear the necessity for
regulatory reform. When all was said and done, Enron, which by the year 2000
had grown to be the sixth-largest energy company in the world, 9 became the
largest company in U.S. history to declare bankruptcy.3 ° The impact on U.S.
markets from Enron, compounded by numerous similar corporate scandals,31
was truly seismic.32
Without doubt, Enron's corporate executives, including Kenneth Lay and
Jeffrey Skilling, shoulder a sizeable share of the blame. Ironically, however,
among the factors leading to the corporate corruption that was the impetus for
Congress's SOX reforms were various deregulatory initiatives taken by
Congress in the mid-1990s. For example, the effect of the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA) 33 was to make it "harder for defrauded
investors to sue [violating companies] in the United States. 3 4 Moreover,
"[s]tudies have shown that the PSLRA [and other deregulatory acts] enabled
an environment that almost invited the fraud that spun out of control in the
corporate fiascos of Enron" and others.35
An additional factor is identified in the SOX reforms' emphasis on greater
oversight of auditors and corporate management,36 which speaks to the

Nance Lucas, An Interview with United States SenatorPaul S. Sarbanes, 11 J.LEADERSHIP &
ORG. STUD. 3, 4-5 (2004).
29 Chron.com, The Fall ofEnron: Timeline, http://www.chron.com/news/specials/enron/tim
eline.html (last visited Jan. 15, 2010).

30 JOHN T. BOSTELMAN, PRAc.L. INST., THE SARBANEs-OXLEY DESKBOOK § 2:2.1 (2005).

Such corporate scandals included WorldCom, Global Crossing, Qwest, and Tyco. John
Paul Lucci, Enron-The Bankruptcy HeardAround the World and the InternationalRicochet
of Sarbanes-Oxley, 67 ALB. L. REV. 211, 212 (2003).
32 All told, shareholders lost $460 billion from these corporate scandals. Id. By October 9,
2002, the value of the S&P 500 Index had fallen by over 50% from its record high on March 24,
2000. John Armour & Joseph A. McCahery, Introduction, in AFTER ENRON: IMPROVING
CORPORATE LAW AND MODERNISING SECURITIES REGULATION IN EUROPE AND THE US 1, 1
(John Armour & Joseph A. McCahery eds., 2006).
" Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (1995) (codified as amendments in scattered sections
of 15 U.S.C.).
14 Robert A. Prentice, Stoneridge, SecuritiesFraudLitigation, and the Supreme Court,45
AM. Bus. L.J. 611, 680 (2008).
35 andr6 douglas pond cummings, Still "Ain't No Glory in Pain": How the
TelecommunicationsAct of 1996 and Other 1990s DeregulationFacilitatedthe Market Crash
of 2002, 12 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 467, 471-72; see also John C. Coffee, Jr.,
UnderstandingEnron: "It's About the Gatekeepers, Stupid," 57 Bus. LAW. 1403, 1408-09
(2002) (suggesting that the PSLRA's protection ofauditors from liability for their errors was one
factor contributing to the Enron-era scandals).
36 For example, Title I of SOX creates the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board
(PCAOB). Sarbanes-OxleyAct (SOX) of 2002 § 101, 15 U.S.C. § 7211 (2006). See also Public
31
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insufficiency of such oversight pre-SOX. Indeed, "[w]hile there will always
be wrongdoing, one of the great failures during this period was the failure of
'gatekeepers' to fulfill their responsibilities. 37
1. Lack ofAuditor Independence
One of the gatekeepers to fail in the Enron debacle was the company's
auditing firm, Arthur Andersen. 3' To avoid conflicts of interest that could
compromise the integrity of an audit, such firms ought to remain independent
of the client company. This safeguard was distinctly lacking in the EnronArthur Andersen relationship.39
In addition to providing Enron with auditing services, Arthur Andersen also
realized significant profits by providing Enron with consulting services that
largely consisted of advising Enron on the structuring of business deals.4 °
Obviously, an accounting firm's audit client serving as a significant source of
revenue for additional services suggests a potential conflict of interest.4"
Further, the "consulting fees may also have been lucrative enough to deter
42
Andersen from asking Enron to make revisions to its financial statements.
2. Weak CorporateGovernanceandEthics
Another set of gatekeepers to fall short of its obligations was Enron's board
of directors and the company's audit committee. Though both Enron's board
and its audit committee appeared to be gold standards,43 they both tarnished

Company Accounting Oversight Board, http://www.pcaobus.org (last visited Jan. 15, 2010).
37 Charles W. Murdock, Sarbanes-OxleyFive Years Later:Hero or Villain, 39 Loy. U. Ci.
L.J. 525, 526 (2008) (citing JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., GATEKEEPERS: THE PROFESSIONS AND
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE (2006) (describing gatekeepers, in the footnote, as "those who advise
and inform boards of directors, and how their failure to raise red flags about questionable
practices contributed to corporate scandals")).
3 See id. at 526-30 (giving a description of a specific questionable Enron transaction in
which Arthur Andersen was complicit).
39 Id.
' Andersen received $52 million from Enron in 2000, with approximately half($25 million)
for audit services and the remainder ($27 million) for consulting services. Van Niel, supra
note 27, at 17.
"' See id. ("Andersen's extensive consulting work for Enron may well have compromised
its independence and its judgment in determining the nature, timing, and extent of audit
procedures.").
42 Id. ("Andersen estimated that keeping Enron as a client would generate $100 million a
year in revenues.").
" Jeffrey N. Gordon, GovernanceFailuresof the Enron Boardand the New Information
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that standard significantly. Moreover, corporate wrongdoing such as that at
Enron is, by its nature, fraught with ethical violations. Several examples from
the Enron context, described below, flesh out the laissez-faire approach of the
board and audit committee as well as the obviously lower priority given to
maintaining ethical standards.
First, Enron utilized stock options in order to maintain high levels of
compensation for its executives.' This created two significant issues: "[T]he
interaction of Enron's high-powered stock-based compensation structure, [and]
the corresponding managerial temptation to manipulate financial results that
would affect the stock price.., created an unusual risk that should have called
forth unusual, intense Board monitoring of business results and financial
controls." ' 5 Such scrutiny by the board, however, did not occur.46
Additionally, in issuing stock-option grants to its executives, Enron did not
treat such grants as a form of compensation and, thus, did not list the grants as
expenses.47 "Though not illegal, this practice allows the posting of financial
data that is not complete, especially in Enron's case, where stock options
represented a very large and important form of employee compensation." '
Further, Enron utilized exceedingly complicated and opaque financial
reports, making it virtually impossible to diagnose the company's financial
health, even for trained analysts. 49 Given this complexity, one would expect
Enron's audit committee meetings to be incredibly detailed in order to provide
a thorough analysis of the company's activities. However, while meeting
agenda may have outlined a broad scope and depth of detail, it appears from
actual meeting minutes that the committee "was merely going through the

Order of Sarbanes-Oxley, 35 CoNN. L. REv. 1125, 1127 (2003) ("[Tlhe Enron Board was
composed largely of outside directors, who were apparently independent and competent. The
audit committee, which operated under a state of the art charter, was chaired by a Stanford
Business School accounting professor.").
" Id. at 1129-30; see also Van Niel, supra note 27, at 16 ("The use of stock option
grants . .. actually started as a reaction to a $1,000,000 cap on salaries for top-level
employees.").
4"Gordon, supra note 43, at 1128.
46Id.
41 Van Niel, supra note 27, at 16.
" Id. ("Had Enron reported the granting of stock options in the manner proposed by the
Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), Enron's profits from 1998 through 2000 would
have been reduced by approximately $188 million.").
49 See C. William Thomas, The Rise andFall ofEnron, J. ACCT.ONLINE, Apr. 2002, http:/
www.journalofaccountancy.com/Issues/2002/Apr/TheRiseAndFallOtEnron (noting that key
transactions in 2000 were described in a "very confusing footnote in Enron's 2000 financial
statements").
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motions. ... [T]he directors were lulled to sleep by a lack of accountability in
the system."" °
Finally, decisions by Enron executives caused unbearable losses to Enron
employees, whose 401 (k) pension plans went into a thirty-day "blackout period
during which plan participants were prohibited from making inter-fund
transfers within the 401(k) plan."'" Supposedly, Enron made its decision to
change its 401(k) plan administrators, which caused the thirty-day blackout
period, well before announcing it.52 However, the timing seems particularly
suspicious 53 -during the thirty-day period, "[w]hile Enron executives were
dumping all of their Enron stock, rank-and-file plan
participants could only
54
watch in horror as their life savings disappeared.
The above "examples of director dereliction in Enron ...evidence little
desire to call colleagues to account and certainly do not inspire confidence that
the board of directors will keep a watchful eye on management."55 The above
factors led to the enactment of SOX via the unfortunate route of numerous
corporate debacles, to the detriment of countless investors. A series of factors
in the Japanese context paved the way for the FIEL through a similar path of
corporate scandals.
B. The FIEL: Structural, Cultural, and PoliticalFactors in Japan, and the
Inevitable Livedoor Bombshell
When taken in historical context, the influence of a foreign law like SOX
on the development of the FIEL should come as no surprise, as a number of
" See Murdock, supranote 37, at 533 (setting forth a reproduction of such an agenda and
noting that "[t]he fact that the audit committee spent so little time on so many matters of great
magnitude suggests that it was merely going through the motions").
"' Jennifer K. Coalson, Note, The Sarbanes-OxleyActof2002: Are StricterInternalControls
ConstrictingInternationalCompanies?, 36 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 647, 653 (2008) (quoting
Brian W. Berglund, Fundamentalsof Employee Benefits Law: SecuritiesLaw Issues Relating
to Employee Benefit Plans (1), SM058 A.L.I.-.A.B.A. 707, 722 (2007)).
52 Thomas, supra note 49.
53 id.
54 Berglund, supra note 51, at 722. In 2000, Enron's 401(k) plan contained nearly $2.1
billion in assets, primarily in the form of Enron shares. Coalson, supra note 51, at 654 n.34
(citing John Paul Lucci, Note, New York Revises Ethics Rules to Permit Limited MDPs: A
CriticalAnalysis of the New York Approach, the Future of the MDPDebate After Enron, and
Recommendationsfor Other Jurisdictions,8 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 151, 192 (2003)).
In 2001, its value dropped by 94%. Coalson, supranote 51, at 654 n.34.
" Murdock, supra note 37, at 537. Murdock goes on to state that "the dominant thrust of
judicial decisions [dealing with such corporate wrongdoing] is essentially blind deference to
boards of directors. If there is no one looking over your shoulder, why worry?" Id.
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Japan's foundational corporate laws are rooted in foreign-law transplants. A
prime example is Japan's original Commercial Code,56 "imported" from
Germany in the late nineteenth century5 7 as part of the Meji58 legal reforms.
Further foreign law influence came from the U.S. occupation of Japan
following World War II, during which time the corporate law was amended59
to be more in line with U.S. corporate law.6"
Likewise, during the same postwar occupation period, the FIEL's
predecessor, the Securities and Exchange Law, assumed its role as Japan's
fundamental securities law. 6' The Securities and Exchange Law was directly
modeled after U.S. federal securities statutes62 and "thus, at least in form,
reflected the classic

.

. . thesis underlying Anglo-American corporate

governance: the notion that widely dispersed shareholders (perceived as
inevitable) cede effective control of their firm to professional managers via an
agency relationship with independent directors. 63 However, despite U.S.
efforts to create an "economic democracy" through regulatory changes like
those mentioned above, the hoped-for shift to such an ideal never materialized
in Japan in the remaining fifty years of the twentieth century. 65 Nonetheless,
such a result had little impact on Japanese economic activity during much of

56 Sho ho [Commercial Code], Law No. 48 of 1899, Part

II (amended by Law No. 71

of 1997) (including legal rules for business corporations).
17Curtis J. Milhaupt, Historical Pathways of Reform: Foreign Law Transplants and
JapaneseCorporateGovernance, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INCONTEXT: CORPORATIONS,

STATES, AND MARKETS IN EUROPE, JAPAN, AND THE US 53, 53-55 (Klaus J. Hopt et al.
eds., 2005). "[The code's] basic structure and characteristics-the prescription of detailed
capital requirements and strong shareholder control rights over corporate decisions-reflect this
German origin." Id. at 55.
58The Meii period (1868-1912) brought about the modernization of Japan from its feudal
roots. Library of Congress Country Studies, Japan, http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?frd/cst
dy:@field(DOCID+jp0035 (last visited Jan. 15, 2010).
" Milhaupt, supra note 57, at 55. The amendments "principally . . . strengthen[ed]
perceived weaknesses in minority shareholder rights and 'corporate democracy', but these
amendments arguably added to, rather than relaxed, the code's rigidities." Id. Indeed, the
revised law was "surprisingly paternalistic, archaic and impractical"--for example, the law
prohibited, with few exceptions, corporate stock repurchases and limited the type of equity a
company could issue. Id. at 55-56.
0
61

Id.

Stuber et al., supra note 2, at 457 n.95.

62 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77(a) (2006); Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15

U.S.C. § 78(a) (2006).
63 Stuber et al., supra note 2, at 457 n.95.
64Id.
65

Id.
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that same fifty-year period.' An exploration of factors underlying Japan's
delayed acceptance of foreign market practices is pertinent to an understanding
of its simultaneous realization of postwar economic growth.
These fundamental factors can be divided into three primary, though nonexclusive, categories: structural, cultural, and political.67 In order to develop
these factors with clarity, it is prudent to examine their development in context.
As previously stated, an integral motivating force behind the FEEL was a
determination to "enhance the attractiveness of the Japanese market as an
international market," or in other words to encourage foreign direct investment
(FDI).6 Such a push for FDI is not a new development. Indeed, the FIEL is
in stride with a trend of FDI growth that Japan has seen since the 1990s.69
Moreover, with growth in FDI comes a correlative increase in mergers 7 and
acquisitions 71 (M&A) and tender offer bid72 (TOB) activity. One need look no
further than the FIEL's provision on TOBs7 3 for evidence that the law's drafters
addressed such a connection between a rise in this sort of activity and an
increase in FDI. Thus, looking through the lens of a marked rise in M&A,
TOB activity is 74 an ideal means by which to comprehend the structural,

Yoshiro Miwa & J. Mark Ramseyer, Asking the Wrong Question: Changesof Governance
in HistoricalPerspective?, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INCONTEXT, supra note 57, at 73, 74
("In 1970 prices, the gross national expenditure climbed from 16.8 billion yen in 1955 to 40.9
billion in 1965 and 92.0 in 1975--quintupling in 20 years. From 1975 to 2000, real wages
climbed by nearly a third yet again. In 1870, per capita real GDP in Japan was 85% of the world
average. By 1998, that figure had climbed to 358 0/o--behind the US (479%) but beyond France
(343%), Germany (312%), and the UK (328%).").
67 See ENRicO COLCERA, THE MARKET FOR CORPORATE CONTROL IN JAPAN: M&As,
HOSTILE TAKEOVERS AND REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 4 (2007) (listing other factors as well).
68 FSA DESCRIPTION, supra note 8, at 1.
69 See Political Factors discussion infra Part II.B.3.
70 Colcera defines a merger as the "process through which two different and autonomous
companiesjoin together and become a sole juridical and economic entity," and can take the form
either of one company absorbing the other or, alternatively, of the two merging companies
combining to form into a new corporation. COLCERA, supra note 67, at 5.
7' An acquisition is a transaction through which" 'one firm, A, pays for all the assets or all
the stock of another, B.' " Id.at 7 (quoting D.A. OESTERLE, THE LAW OF MERGERS AND
AcQuIsmONs 1(1999)).
72 A tender offer bid is also known as a "takeover" bid. A takeover, at least in a stock
purchase context, is a" 'stock purchase offer in which the acquiring firm buys a controlling
block of stock in a target, most often a majority of the outstanding voting stock. The controlling
block of stocks enables the purchasing firm to elect the target's board of directors and to
effect ...
mergers.' "Id. (quoting OESTERLE,supra note 71, at 3).
7'See discussion infra Part III.B.
7 Indeed, in 2005, Japan's M&A market growth was the most active in the world, surpassing
even the United States, the United Kingdom, and Australia. Marcelo Bombau et al.,
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cultural, and political factors affecting Japan's delayed acceptance of foreign
market practices.
1. StructuralFactors
A key driver of Japan's dynamic postwar economic growth was a network
of various corporate relationships centered around a "main bank."75 Given the
challenges inherent in a post-war recovery, "[t]he old model was well suited to
the times: it delivered social stability and cohesion as Japanese workers pulled
together to catch up with Western nations, and helped Japan to become the
world's second-biggest economy."76
The roots of the old model can be traced back to the pre-war
zaibatsu-holding companies which had controlling interests in a group of
firms, "many of which, in turn, had controlling interests in other firms."' 7 7 By
imposing an anti-monopoly statute, the Allied Forces dissolved the zaibatsu
following World War II in order to "introduce 'Western' principles of
corporate democracy and to dismantle the industrial underpinnings of Japanese
militarism. 78 However, subsequent amendments to this anti-monopoly statute
resurrected the possibility for cross-shareholding between firms.79
Indeed, it was those reciprocal cross-, as well as stable, shareholdings that
served as the foundation for the strength of the symbiotic network of postwar
corporate relationships.80 Effectively, cross-shareholding is, as its name
suggests, two or more companies that hold shares in one another, though the
ratios of shareholding may not necessarily be balanced." Stable shareholding,
InternationalMergersand Acquisitions, 40 INT'L LAW. 311, 325 (2006). Compared with the
previous year, Japan saw a 23% increase in the volume of M&A deals and a more than doubling
of the deals' total value. Id.
71 Going Hybrid, ECONOMIST, Dec. 1, 2007, at 65. "[A]t the core of Japan's main bank

model was its heavily regulated and quasi-government-controlled banking industry (not its
financial markets). Although Japanese companies borrowed from many banks, most companies
had a special relationship with only one: their main bank." Dan W. Puchniak, The Efficiency
ofFriendliness:JapaneseCorporateGovernanceSucceeds Again Without Hostile Takeovers, 5
BERKELEY Bus. L.J. 195, 206 (2008).
76 Going Hybrid,supra note 75, at 65.
17

U.N. Dep't of Econ. & Soc. Affairs [DESA], Discussion Paper: Bank-Firm Cross-

Shareholdingin Japan: What Is It, Why Does It Matter,Is It Winding Down?, at 4, U.N. Doc.

ST/ESA/1999/DP. 15 (Feb. 2001) (preparedby Mark Scher) [hereinafter Discussion Paper].
78 Id. ("As a result, individual [rather than corporate] investors held 69 per cent [sic] of all
outstanding shares in 1949.").
9 Stuber et al., supra note 2, at 457 n.95.
o GoingHybrid, supranote 75, at 65.
81 COLCERA, supranote 67, at 75. Interestingly, in contrast to cross-shareholding structures
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in contrast to cross-shareholding's consideration only of the mutual
shareholding relationship, also "considers... one-sided holdings of financial
institutions and listed affiliated companies, which retain companies' shares for
a specific, long period of time." 2 Thus, despite the nomenclature, both types
of shareholdings provided their own forms of stability for participating
companies by limiting the number of shares available on the market and
"insulat[ing] the management of both sides from any market threat of hostile
takeover." 3
Responding to U.S. criticism, Japan's Economic Planning Agency, gave a
similar justification for the practice of cross-shareholding in 1992, laying out
its reasoning in three parts:
a) cross-shareholdings ensure that stable partners and stable
investors are able to buy newly issued stocks whenever necessary,
and so they represent a secure source of funding;
b) cross-shareholdings eliminate the threat of hostile takeovers,
therefore allowing the management to pursue long-term plans;
c) cross-shareholdings stabilize and reinforce business relations
between companies.'
When examining cross-shareholding in the Japanese context, one cannot
avoid the related concept of keiretsuI5 nshort, keiretsu are integrated
corporate conglomerates operating under a concept encompassing
characteristics of both cross- and stable shareholding.8 6 A more extensive
definition, however, has been offered by the Japan Export Information

in France, which are comprised of related companies, cross-shareholding in Japan consists of
unrelated companies, thereby "giving each company greater incentive to monitor the other
companies to prevent the rise of an absolute power in the group." YADONG LuO, GLOBAL
DIMENsIONs OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 44 (2007).
82 COLCERA, supra note 67, at 77 (internal citation omitted) ("Even when [shares] are traded,
the shareholding level is immediately reconstituted through a new repurchase of shares which
leaves the stable shareholding ratio intact in the market.").
83 Discussion Paper,supra note 77, at 2.
8 COLCERA, supra note 67, at 75.
" See id. (noting that "[i]n the Japanese context, cross-shareholding is intrinsically linked
with another well-known concept: keiretsu").
" The six major postwar keiretsu were Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Sumitomo, Fuji, Sanwa, and
Daichi. Id. at 78. The breadth of the companies making up these groups is exemplified by the
Fuji keiretsu,which was centered around Fuji Bank until 2000, and Mizuho Bank thereafter, and
consisted of Canon, Hitachi, Marubeni, Matsuya, Nissan, Ricoh, Tobu Railway, and Yamaha.
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Center. 7 Though many accept keiretsu as a recognized element in the
historical structure of Japanese corporate relationships, some renowned
scholars do not subscribe to its existence."8 Yet, regardless of the debate
surrounding the existence of keiretsu, the effect of cross- and stable
shareholdings was to block sizeable chunks of Japanese stock from being
available in the market, with such stock instead being "retained by financial
institutions or business corporations, affiliates or partners, and ...

therefore

seldom traded." 9 Given that "[t]he purpose of most cross-shareholding is to
stable shareholding
avoid rather than confer shareholder rights, . .
relationships function as a strategy of corporate management to limit
shareholder governance of the firm." ' ° Thus, with shareholder governance
acting as the motor behind M&A and TOB strategies, cross- and stable
shareholdings posed a substantial structural barrier to cross-border M&As or
TOBs.
Japan's meteoric postwar economic rise peaked in the late 1980s.9 Equally
famously, the bubble economy that had been propping up Japan's growth burst
resoundingly in 1992.92 Thereafter, Japan's economy entered a period of
extended recession, often referred to as the "lost decade."9' 3 There are a number

87 The definition states:

Keiretsu, or integrated corporate groupings, are a structural arrangement of
Japanese firms that are characterized by close business relationships
intertwined with long/term [sic] commitments among their members.
Keiretsu firms are tied in with one another through cross-shareholdings, longstanding buyer-supplier arrangements, interlocking directorates, the exchange
of personnel among member firms, access to credit and marketing channels,
management ties through presidents' clubs, and the sharing of information
concerning product development and distribution.
Id. at 75 (citing ERIK KENNEDY ET AL., U.S. DEP'T OF COM., JAPAN EXPORT INFO. CTR.,
DESTINATION JAPAN: A BUSINESS GUIDE FOR THE 90'S (2d ed. 1994), http://www.umsl.edu/serv
ices/govdocs/obr/obr_0026.htm).
88 See, e.g., YOsHIRO MIwA & J. MARK RAMSEYER, THE FABLE OF THE KEIRETSU 59 (2006)
(concluding that keiretsu are mere "creatures of the academic and journalistic imagination").
89 COLCERA, supra note 67, at 81.
90 Discussion Paper,supra note 77, at 2.
" See Peter King, YOUR MONEY: Feeling the Downside of Buy-and-Hold, NEWSDAY,
Feb. 8, 2009, at A54 (noting that "[t]he Nikkei 225 ... hit an all-time high of 38,916 on
Dec. 29, 1989").
92 Small, supra note 1, at 347.
9' Id.at 347-48. In the days following record losses across U.S. stock markets in 2008, U.S.
media outlets began recalling Japan's "lost decade," questioning if the United States is headed
for a similar fate. See, e.g., Anthony Faiola, Studying Japan'sDark Decade to See How U.S.
Might Fare,WASH. POST, Oct. 11, 2008, at A13 (concluding that, if Japan's experience is any
guide, fears of a current U.S. recession resembling "Depression-era soup lines.... [m]ay be out
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of contentious views regarding the circumstances that led to Japan's economic
collapse.94 While a debate over the causes of Japan's asset bubble and its
collapse are beyond the scope of this Note, it is worthwhile to note that the
complex variety of elements that fueled Japan's meteoric postwar economic
growth could no longer keep pace with the less-rigid modem models95 in use
outside Japan.96
Since the 1990s, significant portions of formerly held cross- and stable-held
stocks have been released into the market. Specifically, the level of crossshareholding value ratio decreased from 18.4% in 1987 to 7.4% in 2002, a
decline of almost 60% in that fifteen-year period.97 Similarly, the level of
stable shareholding value ratio reached 27.1% in 2002, down from 45.8% in
1987, representing a more than 40% decline. 98 These formerly cross- and
stable held stocks are increasingly being purchased by foreign and individual
investors. 99 Such market activity is clearly moving in the direction of the
FIEL's objectives, facilitating the momentum of such a trend squarely in the
sights of the statute.
of proportion.").
94 Two common views are that (1) deregulation of aspects of the financial markets in
the 1980s made it possible for firms to access funding from sources other than their banks,
causing banks to supplement lost borrowers with high-risk loans that then failed; and (2) the
same deregulation made it possible for keiretsu firms to shift away from the monitoring and
disciplining oftheir main banks and speculate in the developing bubble, which then burst. Miwa
& Ramseyer, supranote 66, at 150. After introducing these explanations, Miwa and Ramseyer
reject the validity of both. Id.
" Examples of tools available under such less rigid models include "stock options and
innovative organization and contractual mechanisms not available under Japanese law."
Milhaupt, supranote 57, at 57.
9 In 2001, the State Department, in reporting on FDI in Japan to President George W. Bush,
stated that the
Vice Minister for International Affairs [of Japan's Ministry of Economy,
Trade and Industry] Hidehiro Konno described ...the changes taking place
in [Japan's] economy- for example, the unwinding ofcross-shareholding and
introduction of global accounting standards - but emphasized that there is a
growing realization that Japan's post-war economic system "has outlived its
usefulness." [Minister Konno] stressed that the Japanese Government is
committed to economic structural reform, which aims at making Japan's
business environment more attractive internationally as well as domestically.
JAPANESE MINISTRY OF ECON., TRADE, AND INDUS. (METI), A REPORT OF CONF. DiscuSsioNs
FROM THE INVESTMENT-IN-JAPAN SYMPosIuM 2001, JAPAN's CHANGING FDI AND CORPORATE
ENvIRONMENT (2001), http://www.meti.go.jp/policy/trade_policy/n_america/us/data/repoe.pdf.
9' COLCERA, supra note 67, at 83.
98 Id.at 83-84. Colcera uses the terms "stable shareholdings" and "long-term holdings"
interchangeably. Id.
99Id.at 84.
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2. CulturalFactors
Any examination of cultural factors inevitably runs the risk of slipping into
generalization or, worse, caricature. Yet, as exemplified by Japan's postwar
shift to an altered version of the pre-war zaibatsu, the effect of cultural views
on how corporations should operate and interrelate is undeniable. As such, an
exploration of the impact of cultural views in Japan on M&A and TOBs is
warranted.
In the 1970s and 1980s, reluctance toward M&A and TOBs remained strong
in Japan. 00 Among small- and medium-sized firms, and particularly among
entrepreneurs, the acquisition or merging of one's company had a strong
association with failure.'0 ' Similarly, larger blue-chip companies viewed M&A
and takeover activity as unacceptable business practices.0 2 The director of one
Japanese company explains, "In Japan, acquisition is often perceived as a
company hijack, and people tend to feel guilty when they sell or buy
companies."1 3
Such an attitude is markedly different from that held in the United States,
opening the door for a significant breakdown of intercultural communication:
"[W]hen a foreign company approaches a Japanese candidate for a potential4
M&A deal, the prospective Japanese firm will be upset or offended at first."'
Given this reality, the chances of a successful cross-border M&A or TOB are
significantly enhanced if a foreign firm develops beforehand an effective
negotiation style and a long-standing and trusted relationship with the Japanese
firm.'05 As such, broaching negotiations with a Japanese firm "will require
''
much time and patience.""6

By the 1990s, Japanese attitudes toward M&A and TOBs had become more
accepting. A 1990 survey found that 80% of the presidents of leading listed
companies were open to using M&A as a means of expanding their business
and distribution network.0 7 In a 1998 survey, 84.7% of respondents at large
companies said "M&A is an important business strategy," with only 6.9%

'oo Id. at 55.
'o' Id. at 54 ("Views such as 'selling one's firm is like selling your own son' is [sic]
common.").

102 Id. at 54-55.

Id. at 55. In Japanese, the purchase of a company is called "nottori," which can be
translated as "a hijacking." Id.
104 Id.
103

'o' Id. at 56-58.
106 Id. at 55.
107 Id. at 72.
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expressing "reservations about M&A."' ' Particularly telling of a shift in
perspective are the results of two 2005 surveys of top executives, which
revealed not only that "nearly 30% of the leading companies were setting aside
large sums for [M&A]," but also that "64.8% (of [Nikkei Business Daily]
online readers) support[ed] the notion that hostile takeovers can be positive,
depending on who the acquiring entity is.""
Such data makes unmistakably clear that the landscape of Japanese cultural
views toward M&A and TOB activity has dramatically changed."' Replacing
a sense of shame formerly associated particularly with cross-border M&A and
TOB, Japan exhibits "[a] culture that generally does not now distinguish
between foreign and domestic players... [and] does not necessarily require the
existence of long and well-established business relationships between the
parties in the deal... [or] any exceptional style of negotiation."". 1. This current
cultural perspective would appear to provide fertile ground for the realization
of the FIEL's FDI objectives.
3. PoliticalFactors
During the postwar period, changes to Japanese corporate law were both
rare and slow to take effect." 2 Moreover, such revisions rarely responded' 1to
3
market needs, and were more "policy pushed" than "demand pulled.""
However, this trend changed in 1997, when the corporate community
successfully lobbied for an amendment to the Commercial Code that would
permit the issuance of stock options.' Thus, politicians, legal scholars, and
business people now work closely together.
Rather than being simply a random consequence of the Japanese economic
crisis, the increase in the number of M&A is the result of strategic efforts by
political and economic Japanese institutions." 5 The Japan Investment Council
was the first to promote FDI, and thus cross-border M&A, in the mid-1990s. 6
...
See id, (noting that those surveyed were "Japanese business operators and big companies").
.09
Id. (emphasis added).
110Id.at 74.
Id.
112 Milhaupt,

supra note 57, at 57.
Id. (citing Zenichi Shishido, Reform in Japanese Corporate Law and Corporate
Governance: Current Changes in HistoricalPerspective,49 AM. J. COMP. L. 653 (2001)).
114 Id. Interestingly, the FIEL stands in contrast to this trend. Given its objective of changing
the course of Japanese markets in the wake of corporate scandals, it appears to be at least
equally, if not more, "policy pushed." Id.
115COLCERA, supra note 67, at 40.
"3

116 Id.at

88.
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The Council, formed by the Japanese government to encourage investment and
revitalize the nation's economy, stated in no uncertain terms that it "welcomes
M&A in Japan, and declares that it will spare no effort in helping foreign
companies with M&A.""' 7

Another similarly focused, government-related organization is the Japan
External Trade Organization (JETRO). JETRO's organizational description
further exemplifies Japan's shift to a policy of facilitating FDI: "Originally
established in 1958 to promote Japanese exports abroad, JETRO's core focus
in the 21 st century has shifted toward promoting foreign direct investment into
Japan .... ,l8 In a preliminary effort toward that end, JETRO released a

prospectus listing nine legislative acts passed between 1996 and 2001 that
significantly impacted Japan's market for M&A.I 9
Beyond legislative acts, Japan's executive leader has also played an
important role. Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi proclaimed the Program for
the Promotion of Foreign Direct Investment in Japan, which "aimed at
doubling the FDI stock by 2008.,,120 Further, in June 2001, U.S. President
George W. Bush and Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi launched the U.S.Japan Economic Partnership for Growth.' 2' The U.S.-Japan Investment
Initiative was launched in conjunction with this partnership, "provid[ing] an
important mutual forum to explore ways to remove barriers through exchanges
of opinion on key issues such as measures to improve investment conditions
in both the United States and Japan.' '122' 23
One primary focus of the initiative is
the "facilitation of cross-border M&A.'

117 Id.

at 89.

"8 JETRO, About Us, http://www.jetro.go.jp/en/jetro (last visited Jan. 21, 2010).
119 COLCERA, supra note 67, at 89. These legislative acts include:
1) the relaxation of the standards of creditworthiness for corporate bond
issuance made it easier to secure funds for use in M&A (1996); 2) the
simplification of the procedural requirements for mergers (1997); 3) the
elimination of the ban on pure holding companies (1997); 4) the relaxation
of the standards for merger reporting (1999); 5) the introduction of a stock
swap and transfer system (1999); 6) the enactment of the Industrial
Revitalization Law (1999); 7) the enactment of the Reorganization
Bankruptcy Law (1999); 8) the changeover to consolidated accounting
(1999); and finally, 9) the introduction of a corporate breakup system (2001).
Id. d.
Id.at 90.
121

JAPANESE MINISTRY OF ECON., TRADE AND INDUS.& U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, U.S.-JAPAN

ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIP FOR GROWTH: UNITED STATES-JAPAN INVESTMENT INITATIVE 2005

REPORT, at ii (2005), availableat http://www.meti.go.jp/english/policy/05Report050706e.pdf.
122 Id.
123 Id.
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As the most recent piece of legislation addressing the issue, the FIEL fits
naturally in Japan's decade-long commitment to facilitating FDI. However, its
effects remain to be seen.
4. Livedoor
In early 2005, the Livedoor saga became "[o]ne of the most dramatic
corporate takeovers in Japanese business history,"'12 4 attracting widespread
public attention. 25 The "clash between the old and new Japanese business
cultures" made the unfolding story particularly riveting.'26 Livedoor, a "young
internet startup firm"' 27 with a brash entrepreneur for its president,2 pitted
itself against Nippon Broadcasting System (NBS), the "largest
shareholder of
129
the old-line media conglomerate, Fuji Television Network.'
Livedoor utilized an unconventional, though technically legal, takeover
method in which it "amassed its stake in NBS by taking advantage of a
loophole in Japan's Securities and Exchange Law that allowed it to buy NBS
shares electronically, after the trading floors had closed,"13 ' which "therefore
exempted [it] from triggering the mandatory tender offer procedures under
Japanese law."''
When Livedoor announced that it had acquired
approximately 35% of NBS's shares, and therefore a comparable percentage
of its voting
power, NBS and Fuji instituted several waves of defensive
32
1
measures.
First, Fuji moved on its existing tender offer, 3 3 seeking to acquire at
least 25% of NBS's shares. 34 Fuji made this move in order to take advantage
of a Japanese commercial law that would prevent Livedoor from exercising
voting rights in any Fuji stock owned by NBS should Livedoor succeed in its

Bombau et al., supranote 74, at 326.
...Nobutoshi Yamanouchi & Scott T. Jones, Hostile Takeover Attempt and PoisonPills in
a Japanese Way: Livedoor vs. Fuji TV over Nippon Broadcasting,9 No. 2 M & A LAW. 7
(2005).
126 Id.
127 Bombau et al., supra note 74, at 326.
12' Douglas G. Gruener, Chilled to the Pill: The JapaneseJudiciary'sCool Reception of the
Poison Pilland PotentialRepercussions, 67 U. PIrr. L. REv. 871, 878 (2006).
129 Bombau et al., supra note 74, at 326.
130 Id.
13' Yamanouchi & Jones, supra note 125.
124

132

Id.

133 Gruener,

supra note 128, at 878.

13 Yamanouchi & Jones, supra note 125.
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NBS-takeover attempt. 35 In response, Livedoor continued purchasing NBS
shares, eventually amassing a 50% stake.'36
NBS and Fuji then implemented a more drastic defense in which NBS
planned "to issue equity warrants to Fuji in order to dilute Livedoor's stake in
NBS."' 37 Livedoor quickly filed a petition to enjoin
the sale of these warrants,
38
which the Tokyo District Court then granted.1
Less than two months after it announced its original acquisition of NBS
shares, Livedoor succeeded in purchasing a majority interest in NBS.139 In a
final move to avoid Livedoor's interference with management of Fuji via NBS,
Fuji had NBS "loan[ ] the shares it held of Fuji TV to Softbank Investment for
five years, during which period [NBS] would not be able to exercise the voting
rights of such shares in Fuji TV.""'
In the face of this development,
Livedoor's best option was to "seek a truce with Fuji TV .... Livedoor sold
its entire stake in NBS to Fuji TV at a slight profit, and in return Fuji TV
invested around $440 million in Livedoor and agreed to establish a business
alliance." 14 '
However, this was only the first stage of events and the truce would prove
to be short-lived. The dramatic denouement came in early 2006, when
Livedoor's top executives were arrested and indicted following a months-long
secret investigation by Japan's Securities and Exchange Surveillance
Commission.'42 This sent Livedoor's stock price into a tailspin,'43 leading Fuji
to sell its stake in Livedoor.'" Further, the company was delisted from

135 Id.
136Id.

137Bombau et al., supra note 74, at 326.

138Yamanouchi & Jones, supra note 125. The court's decision signaled the growing
acceptance, addressed above, of such takeover attempts. However, the ruling did not leave
target companies without a defense as it "alerted corporate management that defensive measures
should be introduced well in advance of the arrival of an unwelcome acquiror." Id.
139 See id. (noting Livedoor's original offer came in late January, and it acquired a majority
of NBS shares by March).
140 Id.

14' Gruener, supra note 128, at 880.
142Bombau et al.,supranote 74, at 326. "Prosecutors believe Livedoor fraudulently reported
a consolidated pretax profit of 5.03 billion yen in the year ended [sic] September 2004 by
booking fictitious sales, although it actually incurred a pretax loss of 312.78 million yen." Id.
at 326 n.60 (emphasis added).
143Id. at 326 n.61 ("Livedoor lost nearly 90% of its trading value in the two months following
the January indictments.. . . Meanwhile, the Nikkei 225 Stock Average tumbled 5.7% [with]in
just two days of the Livedoor sell-off, prompting the TSE [Tokyo Stock Exchange] to suspend
all trading on January 18, 2006-the first early close in the TSE's 57-year history.").
144Id. at 326. "For its 2005 fiscal year, Fuji... claim[ed] a 34.5 billion yen loss on the sale,
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the Tokyo Stock Exchange. 145
Due to securities law violations,
Livedoor's president received a two-and-one-half year prison sentence on
March 16, 2007.146 Moreover, on June 13, 2008, the Tokyo District Court
"ordered Livedoor Holdings Co. to pay more than 9.5 billion yen to Nippon
Life Insurance Co. and five trust banks, all former shareholders . . . , to
compensate them for the massive financial loss they suffered following the
collapse of the company's share price.' ' 147 In the end, the "Livedoor-Fuji battle
for control of NBS convinced lawmakers to close the loophole in the
[Securities and Exchange Law], and also
prompted many Japanese corporations
148
to institute potent takeover defenses.',
III. THE HARMONY AND THE DISSONANCE
The vast scope of the FIEL legislation brings truly comprehensive reforms.
Like SOX, which applies to all reporting companies including those firms
traded on a U.S. stock exchange, the FIEL applies to the approximately 3,800
listed Japanese companies. 14' Additionally, as the J-SOX provisions of the
FIEL apply to each company as a whole, the FIEL's reach will extend to a
Japanese company's foreign subsidiaries. 5
The J-SOX provisions largely resemble Sections 302 and 404 of SOX.
Beyond the J-SOX reforms, however, the FIEL contains other provisions of
equal significance. What follows is an examination of the J-SOX provisions,
with particular attention to its similarities with and differences from SOX.
Thereafter, focus shifts to an analysis of the remainder of the FIEL's significant
provisions.
A. Common Ground
Specific parallels are commonly recognized between SOX Section 302 and
J-SOX Article 24-4-2, which both require management to sign off on the

and... also announced that it plan[ned] to sue Livedoor for damages." Id. at 327 n.63.
141Id.at 327.
46 Atsushi Suemura, New Market Reforms Too Little, Too Late, NIKKEI WKLY. (Japan),
Mar. 19, 2007, available at 2007 WLNR 5189150.
14'Livedoor Told to Pay 9.5 Bil. Yen Compensation,DAILY YOMIMIu (Japan),June 14,2008,
availableat 2008 WLNR 11188537.
149 Bombau et al.,
supra note 74,at 326.
149 Erin Erickson,SOX in the Land of the Rising Sun, DAILY DEAL,Aug.18, 2008,available
at 2008 WLNR 15431225.
150 Id.
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accuracy of periodic reports. 5 ' Additional parallels are drawn between SOX
Section 404 and J-SOX Article 24-4-4, which govern internal controls over
financial reporting. The pertinent provisions of both pieces of legislation seek
to accomplish the same end: to prompt publicly listed companies to guarantee
the accuracy and reliability of their financial reports by maintaining internal
controls.'
From this common starting point, each law sets out its own
framework for accomplishing the desired ends.'
The requirements found in SOX Section 302 and J-SOX Article 24-4-2
compel executives to certify their companies' reports. This is a simple, yet
vital, component of both pieces of legislation because it eliminates the
possibility that the heads of public corporations will escape liability for acts of
fraud. As opposed to establishing only an executive's
indirect complicity with
54
such acts, these provisions create direct liability.
In essence, under both SOX Section 404 and J-SOX Article 24-4-4, the
management of each listed company must "evaluate the internal control over
financial reporting.., of its own company, prepare reports of its conclusions,
and be subject to audit by its external auditors."' 55 To provide time for affected

151 J-SOX article 24-4-2 went into effect from the fiscal year starting on April 1, 2008. FSA
DESCRIPTION, supra note 8, at 18.
"52Internal control has been defined as "a process that is carried out by all members of the

company, in order to fulfill four corporate objectives: (1) effectiveness and efficiency of
operations; (2) reliability of financial reports; (3) compliance with laws and regulations relating
to business activities; and (4) preservation of assets." Financial System Council, Subcomm. on
Internal Controls, Bus. Acct. Council, Evaluationand Auditing Standardsfor InternalControl
Reported in FinancialReports, FSA NEWSLETTER (Financial Services Agency, Tokyo, Japan),
Feb. 2006, at 15, availableat http://www.fsa.go.jp/en/newsletter/2006/02.pdf [hereinafter FSA
NEWSLETTER].
15 Under both laws, administrative bodies are responsible for oversight of company auditors
and issuing audit standards. SOX established the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board.
Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act of 2002 § 101, 15 U.S.C. § 7211 (2006). The Certified Public
Accountants and Auditing Oversight Board and the Japanese Financial Services Agency serve
a similar role in Japan. See PCAOB Drums up Support in Asia, CFO MAG., Mar. 23, 2007,
availableat 2007 WLNR 6070546 (calling these bodies "the PCAOB's counterparts in Japan").
154 Dorsey & Whitney LLP, Foreign Private Issuers and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002,
Aug. 2, 2002, availableat http://www.dorsey.com/64/Resources/Detail.aspx?pub=29 ("[SOX]
Section 906 provides that a CEO or CFO who certifies a report 'knowing' that it does not
comport with the certification is criminally liable for a fine of up to US$1,000,000 or
imprisonment of up to 10 years, or both. If the CEO or CFO 'willfully' certifies the report
'knowing' that it does not comport with the certification he or she is liable for a fine of up to
US$5,000,000, or imprisonment for up to 20 years, or both.").
'5"JapaneseGuidelinesfor InternalControlReportingFinalized,J-SOX FLASHREP. (Protiviti
Inc., Tokyo, Japan), 2007, at 1, availableat http://www.protiviti.jp/downloads/flashreport/JSOX_
FlashReport_02E.pdf [hereinafterJapaneseGuidelines] (providing an English-language summary
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companies to make the necessary internal changes, the SOX requirements were
implemented in phases based on company size. 56
' In contrast, Japanese traded
companies, regardless of size, were all subject to the same implementation
date: the fiscal year beginning April 1, 2008.157
As companies implement the necessary internal control measures, both SOX
and J-SOX recommend a risk-based, top-down approach.158 Neither SOX nor
J-SOX mandate a specific internal control framework; however, both suggest
a framework.'59 The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), which
is empowered by various provisions of SOX, recognizes an integrated
framework called COSO as one of the frameworks adopted by many U.S.based corporations. 6 ° J-SOX suggests its own framework, which consists of
the COSO framework plus two additional components: preservation of assets,
and IT (information technology) support. 161
It should be noted that when SOX was originally enacted, it recommended
a "bottom-up approach" in which "first the data was checked and then the risks
were identified.' ' 62 As this approach was found to be "an unnecessarily
of the Implementation Standards for Evaluation and Auditing of Internal Control over Financial
Reporting contrasting the distinctive features of SOX and J-SOX). SOX Section 404 was enacted
in response to claims such as that by former Enron CEO Jeffrey Skilling, that he was unaware of
the company's practices that concealed debt from shareholders and that" 'this was a very large
corporation. It would be impossible to know everything going on.' " Makoto Toda & William
McCarty, CorporateGovernance Changes in the Two Largest Economies: What's Happeningin
the U.S. and Japan?,32 SYRACUSE J. INT'LL. & COM. 189, 194 (2005).
'56 The SOX implementation dates were as follows: Fiscal Year Ending (FYE)
November 15, 2004 for market cap greater than US$75 million, FYE July 15, 2006 for foreign
filers with market cap greater than US$75 million, FYE December 15, 2007 for all other
companies. Japanese Guidelines,supranote 155, at 3.
157 FSA DESCRIPTION, supra note 8, at
18.
' Corbett, Duncan & Hubly PC, Are You Ready for J-Sox?, CLIENT CONNECTION, Winter
2006, at 1,availableathttp://www.cdhcpa.com/_assets/downloads/Client%20Connections%20%20Winter/o202006.pdf ("A risk-based approach is one that focuses on financial statement
accounts and related processes that are significant, either quantitatively or qualitatively, to the
financial statements. The top-down aspect simply means that the parent company will begin by
evaluating entity level controls (e.g., overall control environment, oversight by the board of
directors, etc.) and will work down to specific processes and financial statement accounts.").
159 See Harold S. Bloomenthal & Samuel Wolff, Application of Sarbanes-OxleyAct to NonU.S. Issuers, 10 INT'L CAP. MKTS. & SEC. REG. § 1:102 (database updated Nov. 2009) (citing
Sec. Act Release No. 8238 (June 5,2003), 68 Fed. Reg. 36636, at 36642, availableat2003 WL
21294970, and noting that "the final rules do not mandate use of a particular framework, 'in
recognition of the fact that other evaluation standards exist outside the United States...' ").
"6Id. COSO is an acronym for the framework outlined in 1992 by the Committee of
Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission. Id.
161FSANEWSLErER, supranote 152, at 15.
162 Harris, supra note 17, at 20.

JAPAN'S FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS AND EXCHANGE LAW

2010]

63
convoluted and time consuming process," it was subsequently changed.
Based on observation of this experience, Japan adopted a "top-down approach"
in order to better streamline auditing procedures. 6
Contrasting with SOX, the scope of "J-SOX is limited to internal controls
affecting financial reporting.' '165 However, this limitation is recouped through
J-SOX's broadened definition of "financial reports." Unlike the definition in
SOX, which includes only financial statements and footnotes, J-SOX requires
consideration of "certain other financial-related disclosures in public reports,
such as financial highlights, shareholders, and the status of stock issued.' 66
Among the distinctions between J-SOX and SOX, "the key difference...
is that the Japanese financial authorities have provided more advice and
information about J-SOX than their U.S. counterparts did about SarbanesOxley."' 167 Specifically, the Japanese Financial Services Agency (FSA)
released guidelines for implementing internal-control mechanisms in a report
called Implementation Standards for Evaluation and Auditing of Internal
Control ovcr Financial Reporting (the Standards). 6
The Standards' drafting process provides further evidence of lessons learned
in Japan from the aftermath of SOX in the U.S. In late November 2006, only
five months after the FIEL was passed, the FSA made a ninety-three-page
draft169 of the Standards available for a one-month period of public comment. 7 '
The public's comments were then evaluated from late December 2006 until the
finalized version of the Standards was released in mid February 2007.'1
Moreover, the Standards themselves are purposeful in applying the
knowledge gained from SOX. For example, the Standards seek

to avoid the confusion and excessive burden caused in response
to [SOX] ... [by] includ[ing] . . . examples of specific guidance

163
164

Id.
Id.

165

Stuber & Stuber, supra note 9, at 522.

16

Id. at 522-23.

167

Marc Jones, JapaneseFinancialDisclosureLegislation CouldImpact UK. Companies,

A.M. BEST NEWSWiRE, Apr. 4, 2008.
161 See JapaneseGuidelines,supranote 155, at I (providing an English-language summary).
Notably, further guidance from the FSA is expected at some point in the future. Id. at 2.
169 See Subcommittee on Internal Control of Business Accounting Council Releases an
ExposureDraft ofImplementationStandards,J-SOX FLASH REP. (Protiviti Inc., Tokyo, Japan),
Nov. 21,2006, availableathttps://www.sdn.sap.com/i/sdn/go/portal/prtroot/docs/library/uuid/
209c60c7-06aa-2910-ed82-84f6f93155c4 (providing an English-language summary).
170 Id. at 1.
..
' JapaneseGuidelines, supra note 155, at 1.
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or judgment [such as] .. . [d]eficiencies detected during the
internal control evaluation process should be classified as
"material weaknesses" if the effect of a misstatement is greater
172
than 5 percent of consolidated pre-tax income.
Another key distinction lies in the audit to be conducted by the external auditor
of management's evaluation of the effectiveness of the company's internal
control for financial reports. While under both SOX and J-SOX, this audit can
occur concurrently with the company's financial audit, the content of the
internal-control audit has a significant difference.' 73 Under SOX, the auditor
must issue an opinion both on the management's evaluation of the
effectiveness of internal controls as well as on the effectiveness of the internal
controls themselves. 74 J-SOX does not impose the latter requirement.
Presumably, this significant difference is based on insight Japan gleaned by
observing the increased costs associated with SOX's expanded audit
requirement. 75 Thus, this would appear to be yet another decision by the
drafters of J-SOX to mitigate the burdens of compliance.
The next section leaves behind the common ground shared by J-SOX and
SOX and shifts focus to the FIEL's other key provisions.
B. Parting Ways
The FIEL makes fundamental changes to Japan's former legal framework.
At the most basic level, definitions of core concepts are expanded. For
example, the new taxonomy expands the scope of both "securities" and
"derivative transactions."'' 76 The former now includes all interests in trusts as
well as interests in collective investment schemes, 77 while the latter is divided

Id.
Comparethe Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204 § 404, 116 Stat. 745
(2002), with the Financial Instruments and Exchange Law (FIEL), Law No. 2 of 1948, art. 193-2,
1-2 (amended 2006) (Japan).
174 Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 404.
"' The average cost of Section 404 compliance for an average company in 2004, the year
SOX was implemented, was $4.36 million. COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, INTERIM
REPORT 5(2006) [hereinafter INTERIM REPORT], availableat http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/
11.30Committee_Interim_ReportREV2.pdf.
176 FSA DESCRIPTION, supra note 8, at 4.
177 Id. A "collective investment scheme" is a "newly created concept under the [FIEL]" that
is defined as "any scheme under which a person: receives contribution money or similar
properties from investor(s); conducts business using such money or properties; and distributes
profits or properties arising from the business to investors." Masahiro Ueno, Amendments to the
172

171
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into three categories: market derivatives trading, over-the-counter derivatives
trading, and foreign market derivatives trading.178 Additionally, a number of
different types of firms are brought under the umbrella of "financial
179
instruments firm," the term used for those entities subject to regulation.
Other provisions of the FIEL regulate "financial instruments businesses,"
which are businesses required to register if they are " 'sales and solicitation'
operations of securities and derivative transactions, as well as 'investment
advisory,' 'investment management' and 'customer asset administration'
services."' 80 Further, the FEEL creates more flexible rules for regulation upon
entry into the financial instruments business, which is now "depend[ent] on the
scope of the firm's business."'' Once registered, a firm must display signs at
all branch offices and business offices indicating the types of businesses in
which they are engaged. 2 Those firms already engaged in a financial
instruments business prior to the law's enactment were required to change their
registration before they could engage in any other type of business.8 3
The number and detail of the regulations governing the sale or solicitation
of securities or derivative transactions reveal a distinct concern about improper
practices in this area. In addition to the obligation for businesses to post signs,
the FIEL includes regulations on business advertisements. 1" Additionally,
once proper securities sales have been successful, the firm is obligated to
deliver written documents before and also at the time of contracting. 8 5
Underlying all of these requirements are two general principles: good faith
and appropriateness. The prohibitions on conveying false information and
conducting either unwanted or excessive solicitation reflect the concern for

Securities and Exchange Law (Renamed as FinancialInstruments and Exchange Law), 18 J.
BANKING & FIN. LAW & PRAC. 259, 259 (2007).
178FSA DESCRIPTION, supra note 8, at 7.
179 Id. at 3. Those types of firms so incorporated are securities firms, commodity funds sales

firms, investment advisory firms, financial futures trading firms, trust beneficiary rights sales
firms, and investment trust management firms. Id.
180 Id. at 5.

' Id. at 6. Financial instruments businesses are categorized into four categories: the "first
financial instruments business" (comprised of "[s]ales and solicitation of securities with high
liquidity, customer asset administration, etc."); "investment management business"; "the second
financial instruments business" (comprised of "sales and solicitation of securities with low
liquidity, etc."); and "investment advisory and agency business." Id.
182

Id. at 6-7.

183 Id. at 6.

"4 Id. at 7.
185

Id.
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good faith.'86 The principle of appropriateness is expressed through the
stipulation that "[i]n light of customer knowledge, experience, and assets, ...
firms must not engage in inappropriate solicitation that may result in
insufficient investor protection."' 87
As a caveat to the above regulations, much of the FIEL's "appropriateness"
regulation is applied contingent on the level of customer knowledge and
experience; likewise, the nature of certain obligations (e.g., delivery of
documents before contracting)
will not be applied if a customer is a
"professional investor."' 88 In keeping with the FIEL's aim of enhancing market
attractiveness,' 9 "in order to promote financial innovation through the sound
development of... collective investment schemes..., a financial instruments
firm is not required to register.., businesses related to funds dealing with
professional investors."' 9 °
Additionally, in keeping both with the sales regulations stated above and the
FIEL's aim of developing public confidence in the market, the Financial
Products Sales Law is amended by the FIEL to create an enhanced duty for
firms to explain the risks of particular types of financial instruments.' 9' The
amended law imposes strict liability on "a financial instruments firm [that] fails
to provide necessary explanation upon sales of a financial instrument," making
it liable for damages.'92 Moreover, "any losses incurred on the principal [are]
presumed as losses to be compensated."' 93 To further the goal of boosting
public confidence, the FIEL also authorizes the Japanese government to certify
organizations that settle complaints and mediate disputes against financial
instruments businesses." 94
As stated above, the FIEL was drafted in recognition of a trend of TOB
growth in Japan. In line with the FIEL's objective of strengthening investor
protection, the primary purpose of a TOB system is to impose "duties to
disclose information including offer periods, volume and prices [on] companies
intending to conduct large volume off-exchange purchases of stock."' 95 This
is to ensure "a fair opportunity for shareholders of the target company to sell

186 Id.
187
8
189

Id
Id. at 8.

See discussion supra Part I.

190FSA DESCRIPTION, supra note 8, at 8.

19 Id. at 10.
192

Id.

193

Id.

194 Id.

at 11.
19 Id. at 13.
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such stock."' 196 As such, the TOB system under the Securities and Exchange
Law has been significantly affected by the FIEL's legislative revision. 97
Revisions to laws governing TOB cover a range of issues. For instance, the
period for acceptance or withdrawal of a tender offer is expanded to between
twenty and sixty business days instead of the former calendar date basis.'9 8
Further, whereas the withdrawal of TOBs was formerly permitted only in
limited cases, 99 now if target companies "take countermeasures against the
takeover, offering companies may withdraw tender offers and reduce offering
prices." 2" Perhaps in response to TOBs like those in the Livedoor episode,
"aggressive buying involving transactions executed on and/or off the market
that will result in shareholdings of one third or more will be subject to
regulations on tender offers."' ' Finally, evidencing an effort to encourage
TOBs by "ensur[ing] fairness amongst bidders, if a party with shareholdings
of more than one third of the target company's shares begins a rapid buy-up
while a tender offer of another party is in place, the former is obliged to make
a tender offer also." 20 2
The FIEL also extends its revision of the Securities and Exchange Law to
the reporting system for large shareholdings. This reporting system generally
requires a shareholder with greater than 5% of total shareholdings in a listed
company to "submit a 'report on large shareholdings' within 5 business days
from the date of the purchase. 20 3 In stark contrast to the former reporting
system, under the new system for institutional investors, "the deadline [for this
report] will be shortened and the frequency for reporting will be increased to
'roughly every 2 weeks, within 5 business days.' ,2014
Finally, the FIEL imposes stricter penalties against unfair trading practices.
The new regulations effectively double the length of maximum prison
sentences and the amount of fines.20 5 Particular attention is paid to misegyoku,

196 Id.
197 Id.

'98 Id. at 14.
'" Such cases include "bankruptcy or merger of target companies." Id.
200 Id.
201 Id.
202 Id.

203 Id. at 15. This is "a system to promptly disclose the status of large shareholdings to
investors." Id.
204 Id. The former reporting system required that "if shareholdings in a listed company reach
above 5%, a report must be provided 'once every 3 months by the 15th of the following
month.' " Id.
205 Id. at 17. Penalties against "[g]eneral unfair trading, spreading of rumors, resorting to
deceptive devices, market manipulation," or the "[s]ubmission of[a] false registration statement
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or "market manipulation whereby dummy orders are placed to create an
impression of active trading that will later be cancelled immediately before the
transactions are completed. ''20 6 Under the FIEL, the scope of civil and criminal
penalties is enlarged, as both now apply to misegyoku by customers through
securities firms as well as to misegyoku by securities firms as part of selfdealing activities. 207
IV. THE ROAD AHEAD

Having viewed the legislative history and integral components of SOX and
the FIEL, it is only natural to shift focus to what followed the statutes' passage.
In particular, both statutes have been subject to their share of criticism. As
noted below, despite these criticisms, SOX has delivered some significant
benefits. Given its more recent vintage, however, the FIEL has had less
opportunity to produce such benefits. Therefore, predicting the FIEL's future
impact may be possible by using various post-passage developments as a
springboard.
A. SOX: Criticism and Benefits
Amid the voluminous criticism surrounding SOX,2 °8 likely the loudest
dissent has been voiced over the cost of compliance with Section 404's
required certification of internal controls.2" Moreover, "[s]eventy-two percent

regarding material information" now result in maximum imprisonment of ten years (formerly
five years), fines against individuals of JPY 10 million (formerly JPY 5 million), and fines
against corporations of JPY 700 million (formerly JPY 500 million). Id. Penalties against
insider trading and non-submission of a registration statement now result in maximum
imprisonment of five years (formerly three years), fines against individuals of JPY 5 million
(formerly JPY 3 million), and fines against corporations of JPY 500 million (formerly JPY 300
million). Id.; see FIEL Law No. 2 of 1948, arts. 197, 197-2 (amended 2006) (Japan).
Somewhat similarly, Sarbanes-Oxley Section 306 prohibits the sort of insider trading carried out
by Enron executives during the blackout period of employees' 401(k) plans and
provides remedies to correct any such action. See Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) Act of 2002, Pub. L.
No. 107-204, § 306, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
206 FSA DESCRIPTION, supra note 8, at 17.
207 Id. Formerly, the only penalties in force were criminal penalties against customers. Id.
20 Notably, beyond the specific criticisms of SOX, one commentator has expressed concern
that "[tihe tone of that [critical] discourse may undermine one the Act's fundamental principles:
ethical and diligent compliance." Cheryl L. Wade, Sarbanes-Oxley Five Years Later: Will
Criticism ofSOX Undermine its Benefits?, 39 LoY. U. Cm. L.J. 595, 597 (2008).
209 With the average cost of Section 404 compliance for an average company in 2004 at $4.36
million, INTERIM REPORT, supra note 175, at 5, "ninety-four percent of executives from 217
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of directors surveyed in the Americas said SOX made them too cautious, and
consequently they are 'not taking the necessary risks to drive growth.' 210
Additionally, due to the enhanced risk of litigation liability associated with
publicly traded companies, "the cost of D&O [Director & Officer] insurance
has risen by 25% to 40% for companies with healthy balance sheets, and as
much as 300% to 400% for companies with financial troubles."21 '
These effects can profoundly impact the very market that SOX was intended
to strengthen, with specific data revealing such deleterious consequences. The
enhanced risk of litigation liability stated above has been cited as a principal
cause of the diminished competitiveness of U.S. capital markets." 2
Furthermore, U.S. markets have seen a drop in initial public offerings (IPOs),
particularly among foreign firms, which are focused more on other markets
such as Shanghai.2 13 Given the high compliance costs associated with SOX,
Section 404 has proved particularly burdensome on small companies, driving
many out of primary U.S. markets and, instead, directing them to the Pink
Sheets. 2 4 Alternatively, some companies leave the public markets altogether
and "go private. 21 5

companies surveyed in 2005 felt that the cost of compliance outweighed the benefits of SOX."
Wade, supranote 208, at 595-96.
210 Id.at 596.
21 William J. Carney, The Costs ofBeingPublicAfterSarbanes-Oxley:The Irony of "Going
Private," 55 EMoRY L.J. 141, 147 (2006).
22 See INTERIM REPORT, supra note 175, at 5 (noting that "[c]lass action settlement costs
have increased [in the U.S.], and [corporate] directors' and officers' insurance rates are six times
higher in the United States than in Europe").
213 Interview with Robert P. Bartlett III, Assistant Prof. of Law, Univ. of Ga. Sch. of Law,
in Athens, Ga. (Sept. 25, 2008).
214 Id. The Pink Sheets is not a stock exchange. Id. To be quoted in the Pink Sheets,
companies need not fulfill
any requirements, such as filing financial statements with the SEC.
Id.The companies quoted in the Pink Sheets tend to be closely held, extremely small, or thinly
traded. Id.For more information on the Pink Sheets, see Pink Sheets, http://www.pinksheets.
com (last visited Jan. 21, 2010).
215 Interview with Robert P. Bartlett III, supra note 213. While many scholars conclude that
the rise in "going private" transactions since 2002 is a result of the costs of SOX compliance,
such conclusions have been called into question. Compare Carney, supra note 211, at 142
(arguing that the rise of private transactions is attributable to SOX and, specifically, Section 404
as the "the principal factor in [publicly traded companies'] increased costs"), with Robert P.
Bartlett III, Going Privatebut Staying Public: Reexamining the Effect of Sarbanes-Oxley on
Firms' Going-PrivateDecisions, 76 U. CHI. L. REv. 7, 8 (2009) (arguing prior studies have
assumed that the going-private firm has, by doing so, become "immune" from complying with
SOX and thus was so motivated when, in actuality, many of the firms typically cited by such
prior studies do not become immune from SOX, particularly Section 404).
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Despite these critiques, SOX has provided a number of significant tangible
benefits. First, it has improved documentation and standardized processes.26
Additionally, in improving upon the situation present in Enron and other
similar cases, it also increased audit committee involvement." 7
Finally, and among its greatest benefits, SOX strengthened the control
environment. 18 Indeed, " 'the number of companies that disclosed serious
chinks in their internal accounting controls jumped to 586 in the first four
months of 2005, compared with 313 for all of 2004.' ,,219 It is not surprising
that, through the required certification of their companies' controls and
reporting, "[s]ome chief executives acknowledge that . . . they discovered

accounting inaccuracies, acquired a better understanding of how their
companies operate, and were22able
to cut costs and be more productive in other
0
aspects of their businesses.

In light of such benefits, it has been concluded that "the policy behind
Sarbanes-Oxley[, that of transparency,] is essential for the proper functioning
of efficient capital markets. 22' Thus, rather than the traditional mantra
"business is good, government is bad, 222 businesses, "instead of bemoaning
the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation, should adopt a new mantra: 'Why Not Tell the
Truth?' 19223
B. The FIEL: Post-PassageDevelopments as a Window to Its Future
A variety of developments since the enactment of the FIEL provide some
insight into its future effectiveness. As an initial matter, it should come as no
surprise, given the FIEL's expansive reach, that the statute has been the subject
of criticism. As one might expect, critical scrutiny originates primarily from
those most subject to the law's regulations.
Major Japanese banks' investment trust sales and other commission-based
businesses saw significant declines in the fiscal year ending March 31, 2008.224
216 Stephen

Wagner & Lee Dittmar, The Unexpected Benefits ofSarbanes-Oxley,84 HARV.
Bus. REv. 133, 137-39 (2006).
217 Id. at 136.
218 Id. at 134.
219 Wade, supranote 208, at 605 (quoting Amy Borrus, Learningto Love Sarbanes-Oxley,
Bus. WK., Nov. 21, 2005, at 126-28).
220 Id. at 605-06.
22, Murdock, supranote 37, at 526.
222 Id. at
223 Id. at

525.
526.

224 See New Rules Turn intoHead-on WindsforMajorBanks'RetailBusinesses,NIKKEIWKLY.
(Japan), June 2, 2008, availableat 2008 WLNR 10404347 (noting that "[tihe implementation of
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The effects of the U.S. subprime mortgage problem on the stock market were
primarily to blame; however, in Japan, the FIEL's requirement that sellers of
such investment vehicles explain the accompanying risks more adequately also
played a role.22 A director in charge of retail operations at a major bank
commented, "Our sales
staff have lost their nerve now that violating the law is
22 6
a distinct possibility.5

The general timing of the FIEL-a law that, by design, increases restrictions
on certain market actors, including banks-arrives at a time when a number of
other factors are constricting Japanese markets.227 For example, the
privatization of the Japanese postal system and its immense banking operation
saw the entry of powerful competition into the banking sector. 228 However,
in response to concerns over constriction, many may point to the long-term
consumer benefits flowing from greater market competition. A further set of
factors includes the general global economic recession and increased fuel costs,
which have caused a rise in the number of corporate failures, prompting
"Japan's six major banks [to] set aside a combined 380 billion yen ($3.68
'
billion) to write off bad loans..., [an increase of] 40% on the year."229
But,
as hindsight is 20/20, it would be inaccurate to level criticism against the
chosen timing of the FEEL when the scale of the global economic slowdown
was generally unanticipated.
A final criticism can be levied, as in the SOX context, against the costs of
compliance with the FIEL. Though there is insufficient data to date, it is likely
that the thousands of publicly listed companies subject to the FIEL have
expended significant human and financial resources in preparation for
implementing the FIEL's new requirements. A case in point is the dramatic
shortening of the deadline for institutional investors' reporting.230
As described in Part 1I above, rather than filing a report to the FSA once
every three months, institutional investors must now file roughly every two
weeks. From the institutional investors' perspective, this is likely a significant
and costly change. However, the FSA has established an electronic system
known as Electronic Disclosure for Investors Network (EDINET)2 1to facilitate

three laws, including the [FIEL], hurt" these banks). These sales were down approximately 20%.
Id.
225
226
227
228
229

Id.
Id.

Id.
Id.
Id.

230 See discussion supra Part IIl.
231Fujitsu Completes FinancialServices Agency's New ED1NET System; New System
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the disclosure of information on publicly listed companies in accordance with
the FIEL.232 To be sure, there are costs to a company associated with
converting its current financial system to an EDINET-acceptable format.233
However, some portion of such costs is likely to be temporary, lasting only as
long as it takes a company to make the transition. Other costs to maintain the
new system, however, would likely need to be absorbed by the company or
passed on in the aggregate to its customers.
In the face of the inevitable difficulties and costs of transitioning from the
old regulations to the FIEL, one must look to the law's core purpose to
determine whether such growing pains are justified. Indeed, the FIEL's stated
objectives of strengthening Japan's securities market, investor confidence
therein, and the related attractiveness of the market to FDI are by no means
quickly and easily attainable. However, the objectives' complexity detracts
neither from their importance nor from their justification as the basis for the
law's requirements.
The breadth of the law's reforms is powerful evidence of the Diet's
commitment to achieving the FIEL's objectives. However, the strongest
evidence of a true commitment to the law's desired ends comes not only in the
form of a steadfast dedication to the law as written but also through the
fundamental principles that serve as the law's foundation.
The Japanese government initially displayed its commitment to the
objectives of the FIEL by vigorously enforcing it, as evidenced by its response
to a number of FIEL violations. For example, at least two instances have
occurred involving firms who used "circular transactions ' 234 in order to

Supporting XBRL-Formatted FinancialReporting Begins Operations Today, JAPAN CORP.
NEWS, Mar. 16, 2008, availableat 2008 WLNR 5194604 ("EDINET is a cutting-edge system
that has gathered worldwide attention. Based on submitted... financial reports, it automatically
generates HTML images that are compliant with FSA regulations.").
232 The specific formatting that the FSA requires of financial reports submitted to EDINET
"will not only improve the accuracy of the financial reports submitted by individual
corporations, but [will] also enable investors, analysts, and the media to readily process and

analyze the information." Id.
233 For example, Fujitsu Limited's XWand Tool for ED1NET compliance costs 278,000
yen (about $3100) per year per client. FujitsuIntroducesFinancialReporting Software; Users
Easily CreateXBRL-FormattedFinancialDatafor FSA EDINET System, JAPAN CORP. NEWS,
Mar. 10, 2008, availableat 2008 WLNR 4724953.
234 NIWS Sales Overstated by 68.2 Bil. Yen, DAILY YOMIURI (Japan), May 2, 2008, at 2
[hereinafter NIWS Sales Overstated], availableat2008 WLNR 8077403. Circular transactions
are those "in which the firm and its clients [buy] and [sell] products purely to inflate sales
records and without actually exchanging any products." Id.
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'
"artificially boost sales and profit figures."235
In one instance, the offending

company inflated its reported sales figures by 45%.236 The second company,

in addition to reporting inflated sales figures, also falsely reported net profits
over a four-year period when it had actually suffered losses in each of those
years.237 In response to these FIEL violations, the former company's top
executives were arrested and the latter company was brought under
investigation with the likelihood of F1EL-violation charges being brought.238
Beyond enforcement, perhaps the most telling evidence of the government's
dedication to maximizing the FIEL's effectiveness has been a responsiveness
to market needs in revising the law to further align it with the FIEL's
objectives. For example, Japan's Upper House passed a bill in June 2008 to
revise the FIEL.239 The reforms included "establishing a market exclusively for
professional traders, introducing new exchange-traded funds in commodity
futures, and instituting harsher penalties for those who breach market
regulations such as insider trading and false reporting." 2" Such revisions were
considered " 'necessary to raise the competitiveness of Japan's markets in a
comprehensive manner.' "24'
Additional reforms currently under consideration also focus on expanding
the attractiveness of Japan's markets both domestically and internationally.
One such reform, which was to be submitted to the Diet in 2009, would "enable
stock and commodity exchanges to combine their operations. 24 2 This is of
importance to the global competitiveness of Japan's markets, as neither Europe

235

Ex-IX President, 4 Execs Held over Accounting Fraud, DAMLY YOMIURI (Japan),

May 30, 2008 [hereinafter Ex-!X President],availableat 2008 WLNR 10131848.
236 Id. IXI Co., an Osaka-based IT firm, reported sales of about 5.5 billion yen, a figure that
was revealed to be padded by 1.7 billion yen. Id.
237 NIWS Sales Overstated,supranote 234. As a result of its false sales and profit reporting,
NIWS Co. HQ Ltd. managed to collect thirteen billion yen through two public stock offerings.
Id.
238Ex-IXI President,supra note 235; NIWS Sales Overstated,supra note 234.
239 See Press Release, Financial Services Agency, FSA Statement Following the Enactment
of the Bill for Amendment of the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act, Etc. (June 6, 2008),
available at http://www.fsa.go.jp/en/refer/measures/20080606.html (providing an official
government-released English overview of the bill).
24 Chris Oliver, Japan's Upper House Passes Financial-Reform Bill, MARKETWATCH,
June 6,2008, http://www.marketwatch.com/story/japans-upper-house-passes-financial-reform-bill.
241Id. (quoting Financial Services Minister Yoshimi Watanabe).
242 Japan Press: Government Aims to Remove Barrierto Exchange Tie-ups, MKT. NEWS
SERV., Nov. 25, 2008 [hereinafter Japan Press];see also Walter Stuber et al., International
Securities and CapitalMarkets, 43 INT'L LAW. 613, 621-22 (2009) (referencing the reforms as
still being "forthcoming" even as of that journal's summer 2009 publication date).
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nor the United States "impose[ ] barriers between stock and commodity
exchanges. 243
An additional reform "exclud[es] a minor form of corporate action" from
the FIEL's ban on insider stock trading. 244 In keeping with the government's
process of enacting the FIEL itself, this reform was to be open for public
comment before it would be implemented.2 45 Moreover, given a growing
global emphasis on addressing climate change, a further timely reform "enables
bankers to directly trade in greenhouse gas emission credits--opening the door
to the establishment of a carbon credit market in Japan." 2"
The Japanese government's willingness to make necessary adjustments to
its finely-wrought legislation demonstrates a degree of flexibility and a
recognition of the reality of changing market needs. If taken to an extreme,
such a policy of legislative revision could have the effect of watering down the
law's initial potency. However, reaching such an extreme is a highly unlikely
proposition in the case of the FIEL, as it would run counter to the Japanese
government's demonstrated commitment to seeking a balance between market
stimulation and investor protection.
In the end, successfully mitigating the possibility that the FIEL will be
handicapped by any amendment will be based on whether the revision is wellconsidered within a broad, long-range view, balanced by giving priority to
significant, shorter-term needs. Currently, Japan's flexible approach provides
a means by which the FIEL's objectives may be attained.
V. CONCLUSION

It is impossible to imagine that a statute as comprehensive as the FIEL
would not be met with some criticism. Thus, the effectiveness of such a statue
should not be measured by its unanimous acceptance, but by whether, on the
balance, it delivers the goals it sets out to achieve. The FIEL has in its sights
the truly Herculean task of reestablishing the stability of and confidence in the
country's financial markets. Japan faced an undeniable need, both for a critical
revision of outdated securities regulation and for a market encouraging of FDI.
Moreover, to the credit of the Japanese government, the FIEL has been

243

Japan Press,supra note 242.

244

Japanto Narrow Scope ofInsider TradingBan, JIJIPREss ENG. NEWS SERV., Oct. 1, 2008,

availableat 2008 WLNR 18676056. The FSA "plans to remove liquidations of minor subsidiaries
from the list of important corporate steps subject to insider trading regulations." Id.
245 id.
246 Stuber et al., supra note 242, at 620-21.
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adjusted to accommodate valuable market needs as they come to light. Thus,
the past and present of the FIEL are promising signs that it will deliver the
desired long-term objectives of its drafters.

